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 Abstract: This paper approaches the evolution of Romania’s foreign debt in 
three periods of time: during Nicolae Ceausescu regime, in the transition period and 
the one which followed the adhesion to European Union. For all three periods the 
external debt management had to deal with different circumstances: the sharp 
increase of real interest rates from the 1980s, the lack of credibility on international 
financial markets from the 1990s or the recent global crisis. We conclude that political 
regime, the efficiency of the allocation of the borrowed funds or the international 
context played major roles in the external debt management. 
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Introduction 
 
During the last decades, several financial crises provoked or, at least, 
aggravated by the unsustainable public debts stressed the necessity of an efficient 
management of the governmental borrowing. In this period of time significant 
changes of the global financial system led to different approaches of the debt 
management. The international debt crisis from the 1980s had dramatic 
consequences on the development and macroeconomic stability of several less 
industrialized countries. In the next years, other debt crises affected not only the 
borrowing states but also the lending institutions. The recent European sovereign 
debt crisis revealed the weakness of management of the governmental borrowing for 
some developed countries. 
For many developing countries, the management of the governmental 
borrowing is oriented mainly to deal with the external debt. As Chenery and Strout 
(1966) pointed out, these countries had to use foreign funds to manage two gaps: the 
first is between savings and investment, while the second is between export and 
import. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) revealed that, very often, the developing 
countries external debt is affected by what they called the “original sin”: the inability of 
these countries to borrow from abroad in their own currencies. In these 
circumstances, the external debt crisis is very often accompanied by a currency crisis 
(Krugman, 1979; Kahler, 1985; Calvo, 1988; Brooks et al., 1998; Bulow and Rogoff, 
1989; Reinhart, 2002; Kaminsky et al., 2003; Eichengreen et al., 2003). 
The main role of the external debt management is the efficient administration 
of the borrowed foreign resources. That function implies activities such as the foreign 
debt monitoring, the projections of debt service payments in relationship with the 
macroeconomic performances or the negotiations with creditors etc. (Krugman, 1985; 
Kalderen, 1992; Klein, 1994; Bangura et al., 2000).  
In this paper we approach the Romanian experience in managing the external 
debt. During the international debt crisis from the 1980s Romania, which in this 
period of time was led by Nicolae Ceausescu, was the single country that managed 
to pay back all its external debt. After the regime of Nicolae Ceausescu had fallen, in 
December 1989, Romania passed into a transition periods which was, in its first 
years, characterized by a dramatic decline of the economy and by substantial deficits 
of the current account. In the first years of this period of time, some political 
considerations and delaying the structural reforms hampered Romanian authorities’ 
efforts to borrow from abroad. The end of the transition and the adhesion to the 
European Union brought the Romanian economy to other stage of development, with 
other circumstances of debt management.  
 
Romanian external debt management during Ceausescu regime 
 
In 1965 Nicolae Ceausescu succeeded Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej as the 
leader of the Romanian Communist Party. In the next years he eliminated, step by 
step, his main rivals. At the beginning of the 1970s he gained absolute power. He 
continued the politics inaugurated by Gheorghiu - Dej of dissidence within the soviet 
block. In 1968 Ceausescu consolidated his image of opponent to the Soviet Union 
hegemony by refusing to join the Warsaw Pact armies in their invasion in 
Czechoslovakia. This position was rewarded by the United States and other Western 
countries with commercial and financial advantages. In the 1970s, Romania was the 
single member of Warsaw Pact country which was admitted to join the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  
At the beginning of the 1970s, Ceausescu started to use foreign resources to 
finance his ambitious plans of rapid industrialization. As a result, the external debt 
rose from about 30 millions USD in 1972 to more than 10 billions USD in 1981 
(Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 - Foreign debt evolution from 1972 to 1989 (millions USD) 
Source: National Institute of Statistics of Romania 
 
In fact, during the 1970s many developing countries accumulated high foreign 
debt which proved to be unsustainable in relation to their macroeconomic 
performances. Several circumstances were responsible for this evolution. In this 
period of time the commercial banks which benefited by substantial influxes of OPEC 
petrodollars increased their loans to developing countries (Stallings, 1987; Reinhart, 
2010). Unrealistic and too optimistic projection over the macroeconomics 
performances of the developing countries justified excessive borrowing to these 
countries (Obstfeld, 1996; Senhadji, 1997; Bangura et al., 2000; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2011). The sharp increase of the prices for some important raw materials including oil 
and food grain forced many less developing countries to ask for more foreign credits. 
In 1979, faced with a growing inflation provoked by the second oil price shock, 
the Federal Reserve of United States applied a tight monetary policy which led, in the 
next years, to a sharp increase of the world real interest rates. In this context, for 
many developing countries which had borrowed with floating interest rates, the debt 
services raised to unsustainable levels. In this acute stage of debt crisis the United 
States and some major financial international institutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank proposed solutions which combined debt 
restructuring and some painful measures meant to improve the macroeconomic 
efficiency of the debtor countries.     
In 1981, when the external debt reached a peak of 10.4 billions dollars, 
Romania was unable to repay its short-term debts. The Romanian leaders opened 
negotiations with IMF about rescheduling the external debt. However, considering the 
solutions proposed by IMF as limiting his control over the national economy, Nicolae 
Ceausescu finally rejected them. He implemented, instead, drastic measures to 
increase exports and to reduce imports: 
- a more pragmatic approach (the efficiency consideration prevailed over the 
ideological ones) to the management of the national economy; 
- the increasing role of the Romanian secret service (Securitate) on the 
management of the foreign trade transactions (many import and export operations 
were performed by firms owned by Securitate); 
- restrictions on the import of technologies and even on some consume goods; 
– the exports of consumption goods despite the needs of population. 
These measures led to current account surpluses, but they had dramatic 
effects on Romanian people living standard. The black market flourished and the 
Ceausescu regime became very unpopular. In these circumstances, Nicolae 
Ceausescu was forced to grant more power to Securitate which on he relied not only 
to supervise the foreign trade transactions but also on its repressive capacity 
(Teodorescu, 1992; Pelin, 1997; Troncot, 2003; Oprea, 2008; Betea, 2011). The 
impact of the austerity measures on the population living standard it is very difficult to 
quantify since the official statistics hid it. On the other hand, the population learned to 
find on the black market the goods that were missing on the official market. 
Meanwhile, the international debt crisis was deepening. In August 1982 it was 
announced that Mexico could not honor anymore its external debt services. After 
that, the commercial banks became reticent to lend low income countries. In the next 
years, many other developing countries were unable to repay their foreign debt. In 
most of them the IMF plans to solve the debt problems failed because the austerity 
measures proved to be unbearable. Anyway, since 1983, the world real interest rates 
decrease reduced the external debt services (Gutowski et al., 1986; Kapstein, 1994; 
Easterly, 1989; Cole, and Kehoe, 1998; Detragiache, 1996; Chamon, 2004; Frank 
and Goyal, 2007). 
At the end of 1980s, as the economic reforms promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev 
in the Soviet Union gained sympathy in Western countries, Romania’s dissident 
position wasn’t appreciated anymore. Western countries imposed economic 
sanctions for the human right violations. Nicolae Ceausescu criticized Gorbachev 
reforms, arguing that Romanian debt accumulation from the 1970s was caused by 
the exaggerated autonomy granted to the enterprises in these years. As the 
economic and political problems aggravated, it seemed that some entities from 
Securitate conspired to overthrow Ceausescu regime (Oprea, 2008; Cartianu, 2011). 
Finally, Romania’s foreign debt was integrally paid back in the summer of 
1989. However, Nicolae Ceausescu didn’t relax the austerity measures. According to 
some of his former collaborators, he intended to use the surpluses of the foreign 
trade in creating a financial institution for developing countries (Cartianu, 2011). 
Anyway, in December 1989 Ceausescu regime fell. 
 
External debt management during the transition period 
 
At the beginning of 1990s the effects of international debt crisis were much 
less visible than in 1980s. The assets associated to external debt were used as 
instrument of payments on the privatization processes from developing countries. In 
this period of time many developing countries started to borrow by issuing bonds on 
the international financial markets. The debtors credibility played a major role on such 
operations. Some financial crisis, in which the foreign debt was an important 
dimension, occurred: Mexico in 1994, South-East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, 
Argentine in 1999 etc. 
In this period of time, the transition difficulties provoked a sharp decline in the 
Romanian economy. The exports dropped while the imports grew. The external 
deficits needed to be financed by foreign credits. However, the new authorities that 
gained the power in December 1989 were perceived by the Western governments as 
not very committed to democratic and economic reforms. As a result, between 1990 
and 1996 for Romania it was very difficult to obtain external loans, so the foreign debt 
didn’t experience a sharp rising, as it happened with other Eastern countries. During 
this period of time, Romanian authorities weren’t able to borrow by issuing bonds on 
the international financial markets.  
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Figure 2 - Foreign debt evolution from 1990 to 2006 (millions USD) 
Source: National Bank of Romania 
 
In 1997, after the general elections, the Government was formed by a coalition 
of political parties which proclaimed their commitment to radical reforms. Anyway, 
some delays in the reforms and errors in the macroeconomic policies hampered the 
authorities’ efforts to obtain substantial external credits (Figure 1). During the 1990s, 
the national currency devaluated substantially as the lack of foreign credits forced 
Romanian Governments to finance its deficits by monetary expansions (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 - Indicators of Romania’s macroeconomic stability  
between 1990 and 1999 
Year Exports  
[mil. USD] 
Imports  
[mil. USD] 
Inflation  
rate [%] 
Exchange  
rate [ROL / 
USD] 
Real 
GDP 
growth 
[%] 
1990 5 775.4 9 202.5 5.1 22.43 -5.6 
1991 4265.7 5 372.0 170.2 76.39 -12.9 
1992 4363.4 5784.1 210.4 307.95 -8.8 
1993 4892.2 6020.1 256.1 760.05 1.5 
1994 6151.3 6562.4 136.7 1655.09 3.9 
1995 7910.0 9487.0 32.3 2033.26 7.1 
1996 8084.5 10555.0 38.8 3082.60 3.9 
1997 8431.1 10411.4 154.8 7167.94 -6.1 
1998 8302.0 10926.6 59.1 8875.55 -4.8 
1999 8502.8 9595.1 45.8 15332.93 -1.2 
Source: National Bank of Romania 
 
From 2000 to 2006, the benefits of reforms became visible and the main 
difficulties of transition were surpassed and the real GDP passed from negative to 
positive rates (Table 2). Romania still experienced significant current account deficits, 
but this time it was able to obtain substantial foreign credits. As a result, the foreign 
debt sharply increased, while the inflation rate decreased step by step (Figure 2). The 
substantial inflows of foreign investment and remittances of Romanian workers from 
foreign countries caused the national currency to pass from devaluation from 2000 to 
2004 to revaluation from 2005 to 2006 (Table 2). 
Table 2 - Indicators of Romania’s macroeconomic stability  
between 2000 and 2006 
Year Exports  
[mil. EUR] 
Imports  
[mil. EUR] 
Inflation  
rate [%] 
Exchange 
rate [RON / 
EUR] 
Real GDP 
growth [%] 
2000 11273 13140 45.7 1.9956 2.9 
2001 12722 16045 34.5 2.6027 5.7 
2002 14675 17427 22.5 3.1255 5.1 
2003 15614 19569 15.3 3.7556 5.2 
2004 18935 24258 10.18 4.0532 8.5 
2005 22255 30061 9.00 3.6234 4.2 
2006 25850 37609 6.56 3.5245 7.9 
Source: National Bank of Romania 
 
External debt management after Romania’s adhesion to the European 
Union 
 
 Romania’s adhesion, in January 2007, to the European Union stimulated both 
exports and imports. From 2007 to 2008, the imports grew faster than the exports, so 
the deficits of the current account increased. This time, for Romania it was easier to 
borrow from abroad since the adhesion increased its credibility on the international 
financial markets. In these circumstances, the external debt continued to rise. The 
real GDP increased with significant rates, but it was a growth based on borrowing.  
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     Figure 2 - Foreign debt evolution from January 2007 to June 2013  
millions euro) 
     Source: National Bank of Romania 
 
Since the end of 2008 Romania has been affected by the global crisis. The 
national currency suffered a substantial depreciation and the GDP decreased, in real 
terms, during 2009 and 2010 (Table 3). During the global crisis the deficit of the 
current account was reduced not only because the decline of consumption, but also 
because the exports of some cheap Romanian products were preferred in the 
recession context. Although the current account deficits were reduced, Romania was 
forced, in 2009, to demand credits from international financial institutions to fill the 
public deficits. As a result, the foreign debt raised sharply (Figure 2).  
During the global crisis several countries, including industrialized countries, 
experienced difficulties in paying back their debts. This situation led to new 
approaches of public debts, including foreign debts (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2010; 
Checherita and Rother, 2010; Santis, 2012).  
Table 3 - Indicators of Romania’s macroeconomic stability  
between 2007 and 2012 
 Year Exports  
[mil. EUR] 
Imports  
[mil. EUR] 
Inflation 
rate [%] 
Exchange 
rate [RON / 
EUR] 
Real GDP 
growth 
[%] 
2007 29549 47371 4.84 3.3373 6.2 
2008 33725 52834 7.85 3.6827 7.3 
2009 29084 35955 5.59 4.2373 -6.6 
2010 37360 44937 6.09 4.2099 -1.1 
2011 45274 52683 5.79 4.2379 2.2 
2012 45056 52430 3.33 4.4560 0.7 
Source: National Bank of Romania 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we approached the Romanian foreign debt management during 
three periods with different circumstances. Some factors such as the political regime, 
the borrowed funds allocation efficiency or the international context influenced 
significantly the foreign debt evolution. 
The analysis of the making and paying back of the external debt during the 
1970s and 1980s has to take into consideration some characteristics of the political 
regime. A brilliant foreign policy allowed Romania to obtain substantial credits. 
However, the inefficient allocation of these financial resources made the country 
vulnerable to the 1980s international debt crisis. The decision to pay back all the 
foreign debt was substantially influenced by Nicolae Ceausescu’s personality and by 
his fear that applying the international financial institutions plans to solve the debt 
problem could undermine his control over the country. The significant involvement of 
the Romanian secret service in the efforts to pay back the foreign debt had a major 
impact over decades. In the years that followed the fall of the communist regime, 
many former officers of Securitate exploited their experience in foreign trade 
becoming successful businessmen. 
During the first years of the transition period, the lack of credibility didn’t allow 
Romanian authorities to obtain significant credits. Although this situation led to 
substantial inflation and to a high devaluation of the national currency, it kept the 
foreign debt to a relative low level.  
In the context of the global crisis, Romania had to borrow substantially from 
international financial institutions. Although, in comparison with other European 
countries, the foreign debt is still relatively low, its sharp growth for the last years 
should worry the Romanian authorities. 
The recent debt crisis reignited the debate over financing the public deficits. 
The effects of borrowing with high interest rates could be almost bad as printing 
money. 
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